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Abstract 
Studies on prospective memory (PM) development in adolescents point to age-related 
increases to adulthood. The goal of the present study was to examine whether instructing 
adolescents to engage in an episodic prospection of themselves executing future actions (i.e., 
future thinking) when forming an intention will improve their PM performance, and reduce 
age-related differences. Further, we set out to explore whether future thinking instructions 
result in stronger memory traces and/or stronger cue-context association by evaluating 
retrospective memory for the PM cues after task completion and monitoring costs during PM 
task processing. Adolescents and younger adults were either allocated to a future thinking, 
repeated encoding or a standard condition. As expected, adolescents had fewer correct PM 
responses than younger adults. Across age groups PM performance in the standard condition 
was lower than in the other encoding conditions. Importantly, analyses indicated a significant 
age by encoding condition interaction. While adolescents benefited most from future thinking 
instructions, younger adults performed best in the repeated encoding condition. Further 
analyses indicated that the beneficial effects of future thinking may result from deeper 
intention encoding through the simulation of future task performance.  
 word count: 185  
keywords: adolescence, prospective memory, future thinking, executive functions, 
imagery  
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Prospective memory (PM) refers to the ability to remember to carry out future intentions at a 
certain time (time-based PM; for instance, remembering to attend a tennis training at 2 pm) or 
following a specific external cue (event-based PM: remembering to give a permission slip for 
the next school trip to your parents to sign, Ellis, 1996). PM is critically important to develop 
autonomy and to be able to live independently in adolescence and young adulthood. 
Prospective remembering comprises multiple phases that rely on different cognitive processes 
(Ellis, 1996). First, the intention needs to be formed. During this intention encoding phase, it 
is planned when and how the intention will be performed. Then, the intention is stored in 
retrospective memory, while the individual is busily engaged in other ongoing activities and 
may monitor for the PM target cue or target time. When the moment for execution of the 
intention arises, the intended action has to be retrieved, other ongoing activities have to be 
inhibited, and the individual has to switch to the prospective intention and perform it as 
planned. Thus, in addition to retrospective memory, executive functions such as planning, 
monitoring for the PM cue, inhibition and switching (Kliegel, Martin, McDaniel, & Einstein, 
2002; Schnitzspahn, Stahl, Zeintl, Kaller, & Kliegel, 2013), play a critical role in the PM 
process. Given that PM paradigms require participants to work simultaneously on an ongoing 
activity and a PM task, both tasks compete for the (limited) attentional resources (Kliegel, 
Martin, McDaniel, & Einstein, 2001, 2004). In their influential multiprocess framework, 
McDaniel and Einstein (2000) suggested that the extent to which retrieval of the delayed 
intention relies on automatic vs. strategic, executive control demanding processes depends on 
various factors such as characteristics of the task (e.g., its importance) and the individual itself 
(e.g., available resources, Kliegel, Altgassen, Hering, & Rose, 2011). In contrast, the PAM 
model (preparatory attentional and memory processes, Smith, 2003; Smith & Bayen, 2004) 
states that PM performance is never automatic, but always relies on effortful, capacity-
consuming processes due to consistent monitoring for the PM cue. Slower reaction times in 
the ongoing task with a PM task embedded compared to reaction times in the ongoing task 
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alone (so-called monitoring costs) have been interpreted as evidence for monitoring activities.  
Both, the multiprocess framework and the PAM model predict larger age differences in PM 
tasks which require high levels of executive control as attentional resources are still 
developing across childhood and adolescence (Gathercole, 1998).  
Early studies on PM development have indicated age-related increases in PM 
performance across childhood and adolescence, yet they have been predominantly descriptive 
in nature (see Mahy, Moses, & Kliegel, 2014, for a review on childhood; for studies 
comprising adolescents see Wang et al., 2011; Wang, Kliegel, Yang, & Liu, 2006; 
Zimmermann & Meier, 2006) and it is only now that research is beginning to explore the 
underlying mechanisms of such age-effects. Developmental improvements in PM 
performance have mainly been attributed to the parallel development of executive functions 
(e.g., Altgassen, Vetter, Phillips, Akgün, & Kliegel, 2014; Wang et al., 2011), and thus the 
ongoing development of the prefrontal cortex into young adulthood (Casey, Tottenham, 
Liston, & Durston, 2005; Luciana, Conklin, Hooper, & Yarger, 2005). In general most 
research on age differences in PM examined the role of person or task characteristics during 
the phases of intention initiation and execution by manipulating the extent to which executive 
control resources were needed (Kliegel et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2011) or available to perform 
the PM task (Mahy et al., 2015; Voigt et al., 2014).  In line with the predictions of the 
multiprocess framework and PAM model, these studies reported larger age differences in PM 
tasks requiring more executive control or when fewer executive control resources were 
available. 
Only most recently research has started to explore the usefulness of encoding 
strategies during the intention formation phase to improve later PM performance (e.g., 
Chasteen, Park, & Schwarz, 2001; Zimmermann & Meier, 2010). Despite the consistently 
reported poorer PM performance of children and adolescents, as compared to young adults 
5 
 
(e.g., Altgassen, Vetter, et al., 2014; Voigt et al., 2014), these studies have mainly focused on 
younger and/or older adults. This lack of research on possible strategies to improve PM in 
children and adolescents is surprising given that PM is considered to be an essential precursor 
of independent living (Kliegel, Jäger, Altgassen, & Shum, 2008).  
In terms of targeted strategies to improve PM performance, previous studies have 
applied so-called implementation intentions which are specific if-then plans that “specify the 
when, where, and how of responses leading to goal attainment”, such as “when situation x 
arises, I will perform response y” (Gollwitzer, 1999, p. 494). Implementation intentions are 
assumed to support automatic rather than consciously controlled goal-directed behaviour by 
linking a specific, situational cue (if-component) to a goal-directed behaviour (then-
component, McDaniel, Howard, & Butler, 2008; Webb & Sheeran, 2003; Wieber, von 
Suchodoletz, Heikamp, Trommsdorff, & Gollwitzer, 2011). The underlying assumption is that 
the (increased) automaticity preserves attentional resources for other cognitive processes and 
goal-directed responses and consequently enhances participants’ PM performance. 
Consistently, Zimmermann and Meier (2010) found improved PM performance in older 
adults (but not in adolescents and younger adults) when participants were prompted to form 
implementation intentions in comparison to standard PM instructions(for similar findings in 
older adults, see McFarland & Glisky, 2011).  
Recently, studies applying implementation intentions have augmented the verbal if-then-
statement with an imaging component by asking participants to imagine how they will 
perform the PM task later in the experiment (Kardiasmenos, Clawson, Wilken, & Wallin, 
2008; McDaniel et al., 2008; McDaniel & Scullin, 2010; Schnitzspahn & Kliegel, 2009). For 
instance, Chasteen et al.(2001) reported that older adults, who were asked to form an 
implementation intention  and to imagine themselves executing the intended action, 
performed better than those that only rehearsed the instructions. Following this line of 
research, Addis, Wong, and Schacter (2008) have noted there seems to be considerable 
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overlap between PM and future thinking, and have drawn particular attention to the close 
relation between the processes involved in future thinking and those in the implementation of 
intentions. The authors point out that the implementation of an intention involves associating 
the intention with a specific future context, which closely resembles the episodic simulation 
involved in future thinking (Leitz, Morgan, Bisby, Rendell, & Curran, 2009; Schacter, Addis, 
& Buckner, 2008).  
Moreover, the brain regions that are involved in projecting oneself into the future 
(frontal and medial temporal–parietal lobes, Spreng, Mar, & Kim, 2009) seem to overlap with 
those involved in PM (Cona, Scarpazza, Sartori, Moscovitch, & Bisiacchi, 2015; West, 2011). 
Accordingly, there is evidence that - similar to PM development - future thinking continues to 
increase from childhood to adolescence (Gott & Lah, 2014). Furthermore, these assumed 
underlying neural areas (e.g. Casey et al., 2005; Luciana et al., 2005) show continuous 
development into adolescence and early adulthood. However importantly, the formation of an 
intended action is not automatically accompanied by a mental simulation of the future 
situation (Szpunar, 2010) and it remains an open question to which extent individuals 
spontaneously imagine future scenarios when forming intentions (Kliegel, Martin, McDaniel, 
Einstein, & Moor, 2007).  
In line with the conceptual, neurological and developmental similarities between 
future thinking and PM described above, first studies provided correlational evidence for 
significant relations between the two constructs. For instance, Nigro, Brandimonte, Cicogna, 
and Cosenza (2014) investigated PM and future thinking in 4-, 5-, 6-and 7-year-old children. 
Both cognitive functions were significantly related in 7-year-olds, but not in the other age 
groups. Atance and Jackson (2009) addressed relations between PM and mental time travel in 
3- to 5-year-olds and found significant correlations. However, when partialling out age, 
relations were no longer significant. Taken together, first studies show relations between PM 
and future thinking in children, but also indicate that this correlation might only emerge later 
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in childhood, and that only older children may be able to make use of their ability to place 
themselves forward in time to support their PM performance (Nigro et al., 2014). 
Surprisingly, studies on relations between PM and future thinking in adolescence are still 
missing. 
It seems very likely that participants should benefit from a mental simulation of the 
intended PM task during encoding. In fact, empirical evidence suggests that simulating a 
future situation may help to translate future-oriented cognition into action (Taylor, Pham, 
Rivkin, & Armor, 1998; Taylor & Schneider, 1989). So far, there have been four studies 
investigating the effects of future thinking as an encoding strategy on PM performance in 
younger and/or older adults (Altgassen, Rendell, et al., 2014; Leitz et al., 2009; Neroni, 
Gamboz, & Brandimonte, 2014; Paraskevaides et al., 2010). For example, Altgassen, Rendell, 
et al. (2014) asked individuals after giving PM task instructions to imagine themselves 
performing the PM tasks at a later point during the testing session, and reported beneficial 
effects of future thinking instructions on PM performance and plan adherence in both younger 
and older adults. Consistently, Neroni et al. (2014) reported positive effects of future thinking 
on PM in a student sample. Leitz et al. (2009) and Paraskevaides et al. (2010) both tested 
whether the provision of future thinking instructions may reduce the PM deficits associated 
with acute alcohol consumption in younger adults. Results indicated that future thinking did 
significantly improve PM performance compared to a control condition. However, a within-
subjects design was used and the two conditions were not counterbalanced: The standard 
condition was always administered first; followed by the future thinking condition. Thus, the 
improvements in PM performance may be explained by practice effects. Taken together, these 
studies lend initial support for a beneficial impact of future thinking on PM performance in 
adults. Therefore, the first goal of the present study was to test if these beneficial effects 
extend to adolescents.  
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Another issue that is still under debate are the mechanisms that may underlie the 
beneficial effects of future thinking on PM performance. Two possible reasons have been put 
forward to explain the positive effects of imagining the specific visual-spatial context in 
which the intention will later be executed on PM performance: a) deeper encoding of the 
intention in retrospective memory (thus, stronger memory traces), and b) formation of an 
association between the specific visual-spatial context and the intention which may later lead 
to (rather) automatic retrieval of the intention during the delayed performance interval (thus, 
stronger cue-context association, Paraskevaides et al., 2010). Consistent with the latter, 
Brewer and Marsh (2010) have reported that the stronger the cue-to-context association 
formed at encoding the better the subsequent event-based PM performance. Specifically, they 
compared three conditions that varied in the extent to which an association between PM cues 
and context (i.e., ongoing task) was possible. Participants performed poorest in the no-
association condition (here, immediate PM instructions before receiving any information 
regarding the ongoing task prevented creation of any association between their prospective 
intention and the ongoing task), better in the standard condition (here, the ongoing task was 
first introduced and thereupon the PM task) and best in the strong-association condition (here, 
participants were asked to form an implementation intention and to imagine themselves 
responding to PM target cues while working on the ongoing task). However, whilst this study 
suggests that stronger cue-to-context association leads to better PM performance, it does not 
provide any evidence as to whether this improvement follows increased automaticity of 
intention retrieval and thus reduced monitoring demands. Further, supporting the assumption 
that future event simulation leads to ‘pre-experiencing’ the future context, Paraskevaides, et 
al. (2010) found significantly larger effects of future thinking for event- than time-based PM 
tasks in younger adults. Event-based tasks provide external cues that may prompt retrieval of 
the intended action during the delayed performance interval. Imagining to later encounter 
these cues during intention formation may be easier and more specific than imagining 
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intention execution in a time-based task which does not provide an external cue indicating the 
right moment to initiate the planned action and instead requires self-initiated time monitoring 
(Altgassen, Schmitz-Hubsch, & Kliegel, 2010; Einstein & McDaniel, 1996). However, these 
differential effects of future thinking on event- versus time-based tasks were not replicated by 
Altgassen, Rendell, et al. (2014), suggesting that future thinking may not influence PM 
through stronger cue-action association. Possibly, the additional time participants get to think 
about the PM task when receiving future thinking instructions is sufficient to lead to deeper 
encoding and thereby improve performance. Thus, taken together, it is still unclear what 
makes future thinking instructions effective: is it deeper intention encoding, stronger cue-to-
context association, or both?  
Therefore, the second goal of the present study was to address this open question by 
experimentally exploring whether future thinking improves PM performance, not only as 
compared to a standard condition, but also beyond the effects of a condition solely focusing 
on intention encoding. During the latter condition, participants were given time, after a brief 
delay, to repeatly read through the PM instructions. This repetition of the task instructions 
should (mainly) deepen the memory traces for the intention in retrospective memory without 
affecting the cue-context-association. We expected that overall participants would show better 
performance in both the future thinking and the repeated encoding condition as compared to 
the standard condition. If future thinking primarily enhances PM through better intention 
encoding, PM performance in the future thinking and the repeated encoding condition should 
be comparable, and both conditions should show similar levels of retrospective PM cue recall. 
However, if future thinking is effective by simultaneously influencing intention encoding and 
the cue-context-association, participants in the future thinking condition should outperform 
participants in the repeated encoding condition, and they should show increased automaticity 
which should be reflected in reduced monitoring costs. This research goal is especially 
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relevant from a conceptual perspective, as it helps clarifying the mechanisms underlying the 
positive future thinking effects on PM performance observed in earlier studies.  
Further, we expected adolescents to show poorer PM performance than younger adults. Two 
different sets of predictions are possible regarding the general impact of encoding strategies 
on age effects in PM performance. On the one hand, age effects may be expected to be 
reduced in both treatment (future thinking and repeated encoding) conditions as compared to 
the standard condition: Adolescents are assumed to have fewer attentional and executive 
control resources (Best, Miller, & Jones, 2009), therefore, their PM performance should 
benefit more from automatic retrieval and deepened encoding induced by future thinking and 
repeated encoding, respectively, as compared to younger adults’. On the other hand, there is 
evidence that adolescents’ ability to engage in future oriented cognitions (Gott & Lah, 2014) 
and related underlying brain areas (Blakemore & Choudhury, 2006) are still developing. 
Therefore, instructions that emphasize the need to engage in future thinking might in fact be 
less beneficial for adolescents’ than younger adults’ PM performance. Similarly, adolescents 
may be less able than younger adults to make use of the additional encoding time provided in 
the repeated encoding condition given ongoing development of the capacity to monitor ones 
cognitive abilities and put in place strategies to overcome potential weaknesses across 
adolescence (Paulus, Tsalas, Proust, & Sodian, 2014).  
Taken together, the first goal of the present study was to test if the beneficial effects of 
future thinking that have been reported in older adults extend to adolescents. Further, the 
second goal was to explore the underlying mechanisms of the beneficial effects of future 
thinking on prospective remembering (deeper encoding, stronger cue-to-context association or 
both).   
 
 
Method 
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Participants  
In total, 49 adolescents (M=14.43, SD=.71; 21 boys) and 60 young adults (M=21.18, 
SD=2.38; 18 men) took part in the present study. Adolescents and adults were randomly 
assigned to one of the three encoding conditions (see Table 1 for an overview of the exact 
group sizes). Age groups were parallel for verbal ability as measured by age-normalized 
scores on the vocabulary test of the Wechsler Intelligence Scales (adolescents: M=10.69, 
SD=3.55, young adults: M=10.22, SD=2.76,F<1); depending on the age of participants either 
the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC-III, Wechsler, Golombok, & Rust, 1992) 
or the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-IV, Wechsler, 2008) was applied. 
Adolescents and young adults were recruited from local schools and universities, respectively. 
Exclusion criteria were any presence or history of psychiatric or neurological disorders as 
well as substance abuse. The study was approved by the local ethics committee and conducted 
in line with the Helsinki declaration. Each participant was tested individually and before 
testing, all participants (as well as parents for adolescents) gave written informed consent. 
Materials  
For the ongoing task, participants were presented with a picture-based 2-back working 
memory task (for a similiar procedure, see Zinke et al., 2010). Black-and-white line drawings 
of familiar objects of the Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) picture system were displayed 
one by one on a computer screen. With each display a new picture was presented. Participants 
were to decide whether or not the present picture had occurred two stimuli ago by pressing 
one of two highlighted buttons on the keyboard. Items were presented for 1500ms with an 
interstimulus interval of 500ms between trials. In the course of the n-back task, 25% out of all 
stimuli presented were hit items. Participants were first presented with a printout showing 
four ongoing task trials to illustrate the task and were then asked to complete a practice block 
consisting of 8 trials. This was followed by 24 ongoing task trials (single ongoing task block) 
after which the PM task was introduced.  
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For the PM task, participants were instructed to press another highlighted button 
whenever one of four specific pictures appeared. Participants were shown a printout of the 
PM cues until they indicated that they had learned them. Thereupon, participants were to 
write down the prospective cues. This was repeated until participants correctly reproduced all 
cues. Further, participants were instructed – upon presentation of the PM cues - to first 
respond to the PM cues and then to perform the ongoing task. To ensure that participants had 
understood instructions before starting the test, they were required to repeat what they were 
supposed to do within the PM and ongoing task. In total, four PM cues and 89 ongoing task 
trials were presented during the dual-task block. PM cues and n-back hit items never occurred 
at the same time. At the end of the experiment, participants were asked to recall all 
prospective cues, followed by a recognition task in case not all PM cues were remembered. 
Dependent variables were PM hits and correct ongoing task responses (both in proportions). 
Responses were scored as correct if they were made before the next picture was presented. 
Monitoring costs were assessed by subtracting participants’ mean reaction times of correctly 
responded ongoing task trials in the dual-task condition from those in the single-task 
condition.  
Adolescents and young adults were randomly assigned to one of the three encoding 
conditions (i.e., standard, repeated encoding or future thinking). In the standard condition, 
participants were introduced to the ongoing and PM task as described above, and performed 
the PM task after a filled delay during which the vocabulary test was performed. In the 
repeated encoding condition, after having been introduced to the ongoing and PM task, 
participants completed a different cognitive test (i.e. the Stroop test, Stroop, 1935) and were 
then presented again with the printouts of the ongoing task outline and the four PM cues and 
asked to study both tasks for two minutes. Thereafter, they also performed the vocabulary test 
as filled delay and completed the PM task. After having performed the PM task, participants 
were asked to write down what they did during the two minutes and to outline any strategies 
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they may have used. In the future thinking condition, after having been introduced to the 
ongoing and PM task, participants were first instructed to practice future thinking with an 
example which was unrelated to the present task (i.e. imagine passing a message to your 
mother/flatmate when coming home). Participants were asked to imagine how this event 
could take place with as many details as possible. This training component took about two 
minutes. Subsequently, participants were told to apply this encoding strategy to the present 
task and vividly imagine themselves executing the PM and ongoing task on the computer. 
Based on the future thinking literature (D'Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; Szpunar & 
McDermott, 2008), participants were encouraged to close their eyes and to imagine as many 
sensory details (e.g., sights, sounds) as possible to ensure development of a vivid personal 
experience of the event. Participants were first instructed to say aloud what they were 
imagining for 20s before they were given a further 20s to silently imagine the same task 
(Altgassen, Rendell, et al., 2014). After applying the future thinking strategy to the present 
task, participants were asked to rate on a five-point scale the vividness of their imagination as 
well as the degree of “living the experience”, hence, how much they felt like being in the 
imagined situation. Thereafter, they also performed the vocabulary test as filled delay and 
then completed the PM task. The length of the first delay, between initial PM instructions 
(including PM cue learning) and the imagination of later task performance, or repeated 
exposure to, PM cues and the OT task, was the same for both treatment conditions, as was as 
the total time spent imagining performing the PM task or rehearsing PM instructions.  
 
Results 
A 2 (age group: adolescents, young adults) by 3 (encoding condition: standard, repeated 
encoding, future thinking) analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to explore effects of 
age and encoding condition on participants’ PM performance. Significant main effects for age 
(F(1,103)=14.62, p=.001, η2p = .12) and encoding condition (F(2,103)=5.30, p=.006, η2p = 
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.09) and a significant interaction effect (F(2,103)=6.01, p=.003, η2p = .11) were shown. 
Young adults had more PM hits than adolescents (see Figure 1). Overall, participants 
performed best during the repeated encoding condition, followed by the future thinking and 
then the standard condition. Further analysis of the interaction with tests of simple effects 
revealed that adolescents performed poorer than young adults in the standard 
(F(1,103)=14.51, p=.001,  η2p =.12) and repeated encoding condition (F(1,103)=11.94, 
p=.001, η2p =.10), but not in the future thinking condition (F<1, η2p =.004). Further 
comparisons also revealed that encoding condition was a simple main effect for adolescents 
(F(2,103)=5.06, p=.008, η2p =.09). Significant differences were observed between the 
standard condition and future thinking (p=.003) as well as the repeated encoding condition 
(p=.02). While the latter two did not differ significantly from each other (p=.50). Encoding 
condition was also a simple main effect with younger adults, F(2, 103)=6.29, p=.003, η2p 
=.11. Here, there were no significant differences between the standard and future thinking 
condition (p=.19), but both conditions differed significantly from the repeated encoding 
condition (standard condition: p=.001; future thinking: p=.03) where younger adults 
performed best.  
To analyze effects of age group, encoding condition and task block (single, dual-task 
block) on participants’ ongoing task performance, a 2 x 3 x 2 mixed measures ANOVA was 
conducted. Significant main effects were found for age group (F(1,103)=10.44, p=.002, η2p 
=.09) and task block (F(1,103)=5.00, p=.03, η2p =.05). Adolescents performed poorer than 
younger adults and overall, participants’ performance improved from the single- to the dual-
task block (see Table 1). All other effects were not significant (all Fs < 1.11). A 2 x 3 
ANOVA was conducted to analyze monitoring costs caused by the additional PM task on 
ongoing task response latencies due to target monitoring (see Table 1). The main effect of 
encoding condition was approaching significance (F(2,103)=2.33, p=.10, η2p =.04). Age 
group (F<1) and the interaction effect (F<1) were not significant.  
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 A 2 x 3 ANOVA was carried out to explore differences in recalled PM cues after 
having completed the PM task. There was an almost significant age effect (F(1,103)=3.91, 
p=.051, η2p =.04), a significant effect for encoding condition (F(2,103)=5.11, p=.008, η2p 
=.09) and a significant interaction effect (F(2,103)=8.91, p=.001, η2p =.15). Younger adults 
outperformed adolescents. Overall, participants of the future thinking and repeated encoding 
conditions remembered more PM cues correctly than those of the standard condition (see 
Table 1). Further analysis of the interaction with tests of simple effects revealed that 
adolescents performed poorer than young adults only in the standard condition 
(F(1,103)=20.10, p=.001, η2p =.16), but neither in the repeated encoding (F<1.45, η2p =.01), 
nor the future thinking condition (F<1, η2p =.000). Further comparisons also revealed that 
encoding condition was a simple main effect for adolescents (F(2,103)=11.71, p=.001, η2p 
=.19), but not for young adults (F<1.19, η2p =.02). For adolescents, performance in the 
standard condition differed significantly from that in the future thinking (p=.001) as well as 
the repeated encoding condition (p=.001).  
 Further, ANOVAs were conducted to study possible age-related differences in the 
vividness of their imagination and degree of “living the experience” during the future thinking 
condition. There were no significant age effects (vividness: adolescents: M=3.44, SD=.96, 
young adults: M=3.50, SD=.89,F<1, living the experience: adolescents: M=2.75, SD=1.00, 
young adults: M=2.35, SD=.88,F(1,34)=1.64, p=.21). With regards to spontaneously applied 
strategies during the 2 minutes interval in the repeated encoding condition, the following 
activities were reported: just looking at the provided task material (8 adolescents, 6 younger 
adults), actively rehearsing PM cues and instructions (7 adolescents, 6 younger adults), 
looking at the provided task material and actively rehearsing PM cues and instructions (2 
adolescents, 7 younger adults) and imagining later task performance (0 adolescents, 1 younger 
adult).  
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Discussion 
The first goal of the present study was to test if PM in adolescents and young adults 
can be improved by future thinking. Further, our second goal was to explore the mechanisms 
underlying the beneficial effects of future thinking on PM and to try to disentangle whether 
future thinking improves PM due to stronger memory traces and/or stronger cue-context 
association. To this end, adolescents and younger adults were either allocated to a future 
thinking, repeated encoding or a standard condition.  
As expected and in line with previous findings (e.g., Wang et al., 2006; Zöllig et al., 
2007), adolescents had fewer correct PM responses than younger adults. Across groups 
treatment conditions led to better PM performance than the standard condition. Overall, 
participants performed best during the repeated encoding condition, followed by the future 
thinking and then the standard condition. Importantly with regards to possible conclusions 
about underlying mechanisms of the beneficial effects of future thinking on PM, analyses 
indicated a significant age group by encoding condition interaction. Further analyses of the 
interaction effect revealed that adolescents performed poorer than younger adults in the 
standard and repeated encoding condition, while there were no significant age differences in 
the future thinking condition. This might indicate that indeed future thinking led to deeper 
memory encoding and stronger cue-context association, which in turn may have increased 
automaticity of cue detection and reduced strategic processing demands, which was especially 
beneficial for adolescents who generally show reduced attentional resources in comparison to 
younger adults. However, further comparisons also revealed that adolescents performed 
significantly better in the future thinking and the repeated encoding condition than in the 
standard condition, while there were no statistical differences between both treatment 
conditions. Of course, this result does not completely rule out the possibility that future 
thinking affects PM both by generating stronger memory traces for the intention in 
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retrospective memory and by strengthening the association between cue and task context at 
the same time. However, given that future thinking instruction did not improve PM 
performance beyond the effects observed after simply exposing participants to printouts of the 
PM cues and ongoing task, the present findings suggest that purely repeated encoding, and 
thus stronger memory traces of the PM task, may be the driving force to improve PM 
performance in adolescents, and that this mechanism may also underlie the beneficial effects 
of future thinking on PM. This conclusion is further supported by the finding that in 
adolescents both treatment conditions (i.e., future thinking and repeated encoding) similarly 
improved the recall of PM cues compared to the standard condition. Further, it is consistent 
with previous empirical evidence (Altgassen, Rendell, et al., 2014) showing no differential 
effects of future thinking on event- and time-based PM tasks which differ in the extent to 
which the moment and context of intention initiation can be imagined. Given that former 
research (Zöllig et al., 2007) showed that PM impairments in adolescents are mainly caused 
by the retrospective and not by the prospective component of PM (Einstein & McDaniel, 
1990), it makes sense that this age group especially benefits from strategies supporting the 
encoding of the target cues and the associated action.  
For younger adults different effects of encoding condition emerged. In contrast to 
adolescents, younger adults showed significantly better PM performance in the repeated 
encoding condition than in the other two conditions which did not differ from each other. 
Descriptively, younger adults achieved even less correct PM responses in the future thinking 
condition. The latter finding was somewhat surprising given comparable recall of PM cues 
across all three encoding conditions and importantly, previous evidence of beneficial effects 
of future thinking in younger adults (Altgassen, Rendell, et al., 2014; Neroni et al., 2014). 
However, current results are in line with various studies on implementation intentions and 
imagery that also did not consistently find beneficial effects on PM performance in younger 
adults (Zimmermann & Meier, 2010). For example, McDaniel et al. (2008) did not find any 
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differences between a control and an imagery condition; only a combination of imagery and 
implementation intentions improved PM performance in younger adults. Kardiasmenos et al. 
(2008) only reported positive effects of imagery in combination with implementation 
intentions in individuals with multiple sclerosis when a resource-demanding PM task was 
used, and not in a task that encouraged automatic processing. The mixed results of 
Schnitzspahn and Kliegel (2009) revealed only young-old (60-75 years), but not old-old 
adults (76-90 years) benefitted from imagery plus implementation intentions, and even found 
detrimental effects of this strategy in old-old adults when a simple task was used. Chasteen et 
al. (2001) only found positive effects of imagery in combination with implementation 
intentions when a nonfocal, but not a focal, PM task was used. Thus, it appears that imagery 
does not always lead to improved PM performance, and the extent to which imagery is 
beneficial for prospective remembering is influenced by the specific task demands and 
individuals’ characteristics. Further, although imagery (especially in combination with 
implementation intentions) may not exactly resemble future thinking, there is likely 
considerable overlap with regards to underlying mechanisms, which may suggest similar 
influencing factors for future thinking.  
Possibly, in the present study, future thinking instructions may have interfered with 
strategies that younger adults may apply spontaneously while encoding the PM intention and 
later performing the PM task, and for which they had ample time during the repeated 
encoding condition therefore resulting in best PM performance. When we look at the 
strategies participants spontaneously applied during the repeated encoding time, we can see 
two main types: looking at the provided task material, rehearsing the PM cues and 
instructions, and a combination of both. Descriptively, as compared to adolescents, more 
adults reported rehearsal of the PM cues and instructions and especially a combination of 
looking at the task material and rehearsing than adolescents. Rehearsal of cues and 
instructions probably leads to deeper encoding than merely looking at the task material. 
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Interestingly, only one participant (a younger adult) spontaneously imagined later task 
performance and thus applied a strategy similar to future thinking. Thus, it is possible that 
adolescents might be less likely to spontaneously apply efficient strategies to support their PM 
performance as compared to younger adults; an assumption that would be in line with 
empirical evidence showing ongoing development of metacognitive strategies across 
adolescence (Best & Miller, 2010; Weil et al., 2013). However, given that we did not ask 
participants to verbalize what they were doing during the 2 minutes repeated encoding 
interval, we have only their subjective descriptions, given subsequent to task performance, 
and thus cannot draw any firm conclusions about their cognitive processes or applied 
strategies,  Further, participants may have had difficulties in consciously accessing and/or 
verbalizing their strategies, or might not even have been aware that imaging a future situation 
is considered as a strategy. Therefore, future studies should not ask participants to freely 
report their strategies but to choose from a checklist of possible strategies.  
Importantly, despite the differential effects of treatment conditions on PM 
performance in adolescents and younger adults, there were no age-related differences 
regarding vividness or degree of living the experience in the future thinking condition 
indicating that both age groups were equally able to apply the suggested future thinking 
encoding procedure. Regarding ongoing task performance, adolescents performed poorer than 
younger adults which is in line with prior research (Altgassen, Vetter, et al., 2014; Zöllig et 
al., 2007). Overall, participants’ performance improved from the single- to the dual-task block 
indicating practice effects. There were no significant differences in performance between the 
three encoding conditions, and no interaction effects. Thus, the beneficial treatment effects on 
PM performance did not cause costs in terms of reduced ongoing task accuracy and cannot be 
explained by a preferential treatment of one of the two tasks.  
Further, to directly test whether performance benefits in the treatment conditions were 
based on higher levels of automatic processing or more monitoring due to perceived higher 
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importance of the PM task following emphasis of the task, we examined monitoring costs 
during the dual-task block of the ongoing task. Importantly, there were no significant effects 
with regards to monitoring costs. Monitoring costs were comparable for adolescents and 
younger adults, and were greater for both treatment conditions, relative to the standard 
condition. This pattern of monitoring costs, in conjunction with the trend towards significance 
of a main effect of encoding, suggest that both treatment conditions led to increased perceived 
importance of the PM task, which in turn led to increased monitoring. The costs also imply 
that the beneficial effects of future thinking on PM were not a result of enhanced cue to 
context association; this would have facilitated more automatic, rather than strategic, 
processes, thereby reducing costs, not increasing them. 
As briefly mentioned above, one possible limitation of the present study is that 
although the results indicate that beneficial future thinking effects in adolescents are mainly 
caused by improved retrospective memory for the PM target cues, it cannot rule out the 
possibility that the cue-context association was also influenced, but just did not affect 
performance beyond the repeated encoding. To further distinguish the two mechanisms 
possibly underlying future thinking effects on PM, future studies should add neural measures 
to the behavioral ones. Studies on PM using event-related brain potentials could help identify 
differential neural correlates associated with processes underlying maintenance of the 
intention and  detection of prospective cues (West & Ross-Munroe, 2002) and the retrieval of 
an intention (West, 2011). A recent meta-analysis (Cona et al., 2015) on the neural 
underpinnings of PM showed that mainly frontal processes are involved in the encoding and 
maintenance of the intention, while parietal processes mainly support retrieval of the 
intention. Both neural areas are known to develop across childhood and adolescence (Giedd et 
al., 1999). If future thinking mainly influences PM through stronger memory traces and not 
following an enhanced cue-context association, it should especially influence those neural 
processes that are associated with the intention retrieval, but not with the cue detection.  More 
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research is needed that does not only manipulate executive control (thus, frontal) processes, 
but also retrospective memory (thus, temporal-parietal) processes (e.g., by varying 
retrospective memory load, Okuda et al., 2003).  
Future studies should also consider using different types of PM tasks such as 
naturalistic tasks that have to be performed in the everyday life of the participants like 
measuring ones blood pressure several times per day (Brom & Kliegel, 2014) or sending a 
text message to the experimenter at pre-specified dates (Aberle, Rendell, Rose, McDaniel, & 
Kliegel, 2010). Although participants in the present study reported that they were able to 
imagine the PM task quite vividly, they only reported medium levels of “living the 
experience”. The current PM task was rather abstract and probably new to most of the 
participants. Furthermore, testing took place in an unfamiliar laboratory environment. These 
factors might make it difficult to develop a strong episodic foresight. Thus, from an applied 
perspective it would be especially interesting to examine, if the effectiveness of a future 
thinking instruction on PM performance may be influenced by the task setting and former task 
experience.    
A further limitation may be that the repeated encoding group performed two 
interpolated tasks rather than one between forming the PM intention and commencing the PM 
task which may have led to ego depletion and diminished PM performance. To control for this 
possibility future studies should double the encoding time relative to the standard condition1. 
Taken together, adolescents showed poorer PM performance than young adults and 
overall participants benefitted from future thinking instructions and repeated encoding. 
However, importantly, differential effects of encoding condition on PM performance were 
observed for adolescents and younger adults. In contrast to adolescents, who benefited most 
from future thinking instructions, younger adults performed worse in the future thinking 
condition, and best in the encoding condition. Further analyses indicate that the beneficial 
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effects of future thinking may result from deeper memory encoding following the prolonged 
exposure to the PM task, and not from stronger cue-context association.  
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Footnote 
1We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this possibility.  
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Table 1. OT performance and PM cues recall  
 adolescents young adults 
 standard  
 
N=16 
M (SD)  
future 
thinking  
N=17  
M (SD)  
repeated 
encoding  
N=16  
M (SD)  
standard  
 
N=20  
M (SD)  
future 
thinking  
N=20  
M (SD)  
repeated 
encoding  
N=20  
M (SD)  
OT hits, 
single task   
.80 (.12)  .86 (.17)  .79 (.15)  .88 (.13)  .87 (.16)  .89 (.09)  
OT hits, 
dual-task  
.83 (.06)  .85 (.15)  .85 (.13)  .91 (.06)  .89 (.05)  .92 (.04)  
monitoring 
costs  
3.37 
(47.12)  
38.03 
(78.89)  
49.47 
(60.27)  
1.05 
(81.14)  
38.58 
(62.91)  
9.71 
(94.88) 
recalled 
PM cues  
.85 (.13)   .98 (.06) .99 (.06)  .99 (.06)  .99 (.06)  .95 (.13)  
Note: PM hits, OT hits and recalled PM cues are presented as proportions of correct 
responses. 
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Figure 1.PM performance as a function of age groups and encoding conditions  
 
Note: Error bars represent one standard error of the mean. 
 
